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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TARGET

A MOVING

Robert L. Knauss*

Six years ago, Professor Alfred Conard did a shocking piece of
research. He marshalled quantitative data and basic arithmetic to
demonstrate that all corporations are not alike. In his article, The
Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 1 Professor Conard described the broad range of sizes of business corporations in the
United States, and suggested that corporation law must be tailored
to these differences. Unfortunately, Professor Conard's advice has
been too often ignored. Most commentators still look to the largest,
publicly traded corporations for their models of corporate governance; they still fail to acknowledge that problems and appropriate
solutions may vary with corporate size.
This Essay elaborates on Professor Conard's sensible suggestion
with the hope that others will take it to heart. First, the Essay discusses the unique governance problems raised by what I call quasipublicly traded corporations. These smaller corporations, whose
shares are not actively traded, have been largely neglected in most
discussions of corporate governance. The neglect is ironic since most
state corporation statutes were originally designed with the quasipublicly traded corporation in mind. Second, the Essay turns to a
problem of corporate governance common to all corporations - the
proper role of directors - and shows that appropriate standards
may vary with the type of corporation at issue. It concludes that the
director's role is best defined in terms of flexible common-law concepts of :fiduciary duties. Together, the discussions of quasi-publicly
traded corporations and :fiduciary duties of directors show that corporate governance is not a static concept; it is rather a moving target,
shifting with the regulatory problems of different sized corporations.
• Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; 1980-1981, Visiting Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, and Visiting Professor of Law and Management, Amos Tuck School of
Business Administration, Dartmouth College. A.B. 1952, Harvard University; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan. - Ed.
The author wishes to express his appreciation for the research and editorial assistance of
Ronald Sweeda, senior law student at Vermont Law School, and Angela T. Knauss, J.D.
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THE QUASI-PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION

Much of the current interest in corporate governance stems from
a rediscovery of old issues. Reformers complain that state general
corporation laws offer little real protection to shareholders, that
many corporations are large economic centers of power yet are beyond the reach of state regulatory authorities, and that shareholders
have less and less of a role in management. None of these complaints is new; all were first raised and debated nearly .fifty years
ago. 2 Current concern among the general public over the productivity,3 honesty, 4 charity, social responsibility,5 and legitimacy6 of corporations has raise4 these issues once again. 7 The concern extends
beyond publicly held corporations to corporate entities that are
formed for nonprofit purposes8 and to large privately controlled enti2. For a description of the debate, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1933); W. RIPLEY, FROM MAIN STREET TO WALL STREET (1932); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Berle, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees:
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). The most complete bibliography of sources on corporate government appears in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE
557-74 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979).
3. Productivity involves the promotion of investment capital, and improvement in efficiency of the work force. The general public has a continuing interest in increased productivity, which includes encouragement of the migration of savings into investment, and rewarding
of good business judgment. The promotion of investment capital is in the public interest, but it
also reflects the shareholder's interest in obtaining a high return on his investment. The goal of
maximizing profits thus is not the antithesis of public interest but is an important part of it.
4. The public has an interest in seeing corporations act honestly. This interest goes beyond
the shareholder's concern for honest disclosure of information and avoidance of self-dealing
by management.
5. The Business Roundtable recently identified four functions of the board of directors of
the large publicly owned corporations: (1) management selection and succession, (2) approval
of corporate decisions which have a major economic impact, (3) corporate social responsibility,
and (4) compliance with the law. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE ROLE AND COMPOSITION
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATION 8-15 (1978),
reprinted in 33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978).
6. The legitimacy of corporate management is brought into issue because of the lack of
shareholder control over management activities. But the concern goes beyond selection of
managers. Managers making decisions affecting the larger community are apt to be as important as elected city or state government officials. The public interest, then, is both in the process of selection, and the accountability of those individuals who are selected. See Hessen, A
New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1327 (1979); Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, in LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780-1970 (1970).
7. One common element in approaching these issues is the fiduciary responsibility of directors discussed in section II of this Article.
8. The nonprofit corporation should also be considered in the context of public interest in
corporate governance. Although only a few nonprofit corporations are as large as the giant
business corporations, they dominate some fields and some communities.
For example, health care delivery is dependent on the private not-for-profit hospitals. Approximately 3,400 of the nation's 6,000 hospitals are nonprofit corporations, and these hospitals account for 80% of total hospital revenues of $62 billion. At least a dozen of these private
nonprofit hospitals have over $100 million in revenues. Hospitals are usually non-membership
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ties that are centers of economic power. 9
Individual investors have much more specific concerns than
those of the general public. Io They are primarily interested in obtaining accurate information so that they can continuously evaluate
their investment and can act on that information by holding or selling the stock. An active market in the stock satisfies both of these
needs for shareholders of publicly traded corporations. Federal securities regulations and market forces inspire publicly traded corporations to share information with the investing public. This sharing
creates a high quality securities market which operates honestly and
efficiently: prices are not distorted by manipulation; short-term price
swings are minimized; insider trading is controlled; and orders are
handled fairly, at a low price. The trading market protects dissatisfied investors, who can readily sell their shares. It also creates a degree of management accountability, since managers are keenly
aware of the market price of the company's shares. I I
Ideally, state corporation laws would offer investors in shares of
corporations that are not actively traded an effective substitute for
the market's information and liquidity by requiring disclosure of
useful information and by mandating corporate behavior that substitutes for investor liquidity. Unfortunately, current state laws fail to
corporations, which means that the directors are selected by the existing board. See SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 96TH CONG., 1ST Sess., U.S. HOSPITALS
REVENUE REPORTS 1976-1977 (Comm. Print 1979).
9. By using several sources a rough composite comparison of private corporations can be
made to the public business corporations in the Fortune 500. See note I 6 i'!fra. It is estimated
that at least 50 privately held corporations, 60 foreign-owned corporations, and at least 15
employee or farm cooperatives each had over $600 million in annual revenue. See CoRPO•
RATE DATA EXCHANGE, INC., CDE STOCK OWNERSHIP DIRECTORY, AGRIBUSINESS (1978).
These 125 entities would comprise about 25% of the Fortune 500 list if they were included. By
a similar comparison about 32 private corporations, 33 foreign owned corporations and I 1
cooperatives had over $900 million in revenues, and would comprise about 15% of the Forbes
list of the largest publicly traded corporations of all types.
None of these entities is affected by any of the SEC proposals concerning corporate governance, and none would be affected by any of the current legislative proposals involving federal
incorporation.
10. The typical investor has been described as: (1) leaving all decisions within the ordinary
course of business to management; (2) desiring an opportunity to vote for management, and
any significant change in management structure; (3) desiring an opportunity to vote for any
fundamental changes in corporate structure, or decisions, made outside the ordinary course of
business; (4) desiring an opportunity to remove the investment from the corporation if the
investor dissents from any fundamental change in the business. To this list should be added an
expectation of receiving information about his investment, and the right to protect his investment both by maintaining voting power and by preventing dilution of the investment. Thus,
the investor expects to be able to make decisions about the evaluation of the investment, but
not in the actual management of the investment. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION 9-17, 64-68 (1976).
I 1. See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 CoLUM. L. _REv. 388, 402 (1977).
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offer any meaningful regulation. Information is usually inadequate,
and shareholder interests are frequently unprotected. Protecting the
investor in the quasi-public corporation therefore poses a considerable challenge to students of corporate governance.
A. .Defining the Quasi-Publicly Traded Corporation
Because of the overriding importance of liquidity to an investor,
I will classify corporations according to the existence of active markets for their shares. The existence of a marketplace for shares
changes the fundamental relationship of the shareholder to the corporation. The ability to trade at any time provides the shareholder a
flexibility comparable to the partner's right of dissolution. The degree of liquidity determines the importance of structural formalities
in a corporation and of accountability from officers and directors.
The key category that I will examine is composed of what I have
been calling the "quasi-publicly traded corporations." This category
includes some 100,000 corporations with between eleven and 499
shareholders each. 12 The public shareholders of such companies are
not involved in active management. The shares are freely transferable, and both management and investors expect that the corporation
will continue to operate indefinitely. These corporations are not
close corporations, nor are they incorporated partnerships. They are
public corporations in every sense except that there is no active market for the shares. The lack of an active market means that the sale
price for shares may have little relation to their value, and that
shareholders in these corporations, unlike investors in publicly
traded corporations, do not have a liquid investment.
The category of the quasi-publicly traded corporation is flanked
by groups of larger and smaller corporations whose shareholders
have varying regulatory needs because of differing levels of liquidity.
At one end of the spectrum are some 1,900,000 small business corporations which each have between one and ten shareholders. 13 In this
12. This is an estimate. Professor Conard in his earlier study listed 71,000 companies with
between 11 and 100 shareholders and 13,000 with between 101 and 1,000 shareholders -for a
total of 84,000 with between 11 and 1,000. This was based on a total corporate population of
1.6 million. See Conard, supra note l, at 458, table 6. Professor Eisenberg, also using a base
of 1.6 million corporations, estimated that there are 70,000 corporations with between 11 and
99 shareholders, and 26,500 with between 11 and 499 shareholders. M. EISENBERG, supra note
10, at 42, table 5.
13. These include one-person corporations, wholly owned subsidiaries, and a wide variety
of business entities, most of which can be described as incorporated partnerships. A substantial number of these corporate entities are involved in relatively little, if any, business activity,
and many exist for only a short duration. Included in this category are the approximately
360,000 companies which file Subchapter S income tax returns allowing the shareholders to be
taxed as a partnership.
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category, investors generally are involved in management, and there
is no shareholder intent at the time of purchase ever to trade the
shares. Liquidity is usually assured by some contractual arrangement, or by a right to dissolution. 14 Thus the regulatory needs and
desires of very small corporations and their shareholders are far different from those in the quasi-publicly traded corporation category. is
At the other end of the spectrum are the huge 16 and not-so-huge
corporations whose shareholders have access to an active market.
Although some two million corporations filed corporate income tax
returns in 1975, 17 relatively few have issued shares that are actively
traded in a secondary market. Estimates of the number of publicly
traded companies vary, but a rough approximation would include
14. Shareholders in these small corporations may find themselves locked into their investment in a manner similar to shareholders in the quasi-publicly traded corporation, but there
are important differences. In corporations with less than ten shareholders all parties are frequently involved in management, and have access to management information. Many of these
corporations are intended to operate like partnerships, and shareholders may have dissolution
rights similar to those of partners. The initial plan of incorporation and the shareholder agree•
ment frequently contain buy-out provisions. The most significant distinction, however, is in
the reasonable expectation of the shareholder. The shareholder ofan enterprise with less than
ten investors knows he is locked into his investment unless some special provisions are taken.
15. This is not to say that the regulation of small corporations could not, or should not, be
improved. The corporations with ten shareholders should be given an option in their method
of regulation. A close corporation statute with the flexibility to allow a company to operate
like a partnership should be provided. The concept is that shares are not transferable, and the
investment relationship is based on a contractual relationship. To the extent a company elects
not to use close corporation provisions, statutory requirements for the quasi-publicly traded
corporation should apply.
16. "The Fortune 500" has achieved the status of a collective noun defining the giant corporations. The list of the largest U.S. industrial corporations is ranked by revenues. In May
1980 the largest corporation, Exxon, had $79 billion in revenues, and the 500th corporation
had $409 million. See The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, FOR•
TUNE, May 5, 1980, at 274-301. The Fortune Second 500 ranged from $409 million in revenues
to $117 million. See FORTUNE, June 16, 1980, at 176-95.
A more recent entry in the ranking game is the Forbes-Dimensions of American Business.
See FORBES, May 12, 1980, at 214-18. Forbes ranks the 500 largest publicly traded corporations, including utilities and financial institutions, in four separate categories: revenues, assets,
net profits, and market value. Two-hundred-fifty-four corporations are in the top 500 in all
four categories, and a total of 801 corporations are listed in one of the four categories. The
ranges for sales and assets are as follows:
Rank
Revenues
Assets
-1$79 billion
$113.0lilllion
500
$409 million
$1.4 billion
Seventy-eight companies had revenues of over $5 billion and 265 had revenues of over $2
billion. The largest 15 corporations had combined revenues of over $500 billion, which is
larger than the total revenues of the federal government. The over two million corporations
had combined revenues of about $3.606 trillion. Twenty-three percent of the corporations had
revenues less than $25,000, forty-four percent less than $100,000, and eighty-eight percent less
than $1 million.
17. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPT. OF TREASURY, No. 16 (2-80), STATISTICS OF INCOME . . . 1975, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 106, table II (1979).
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about 6,500 companies that have equity securities held by more than
500 shareholders and that are subject to the reporting, proxy, and
insider trading requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 18

Some commentators have mistakenly criticized the "race to the
bottom" in state corporation laws for creating problems of governance in publicly traded corporations. Such an analysis misses the
mark. The statutory changes which have taken place in Delaware,
New Jersey, and other "liberal" jurisdictions have not been particularly detrimental to the minority shareholder of the publicly traded
corporation. Regulation of publicly traded corporations remains appropriately (and successfully) focused at the federal level. 19 The real
problem with state general corporation laws lies in their failure to
distinguish between corporations whose shares are actively traded
and corporations whose shares are not.
B. Regulating the Quasi-Publicly Traded Corporation

It is appropriate for states to regulate quasi-publicly traded corporations because the needed type of regulation has traq.itionally
been found in state corporation laws. State laws can have a significant impact because of both the relatively small size of these corporations and their tendency, unlike the larger publicly traded
18. Some 9,800 issuers are required to file annual reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMN., DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, at 1
(1980). The Directory includes all issuers listed on a national securities exchange, and all
others required to file under§§ 12(g) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934. This list includes
a significant number of stock purchase plans and other entities which duplicate the separate
corporate listing. The Securities and Exchange Commission reports that about 6,500 separate
corporations submitted proxy statements, or proxy informational statements, for review. This
may be a more meaningful figure representing separate corporate entities with equity securities. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMN., ANNUAL REPORT 111 app. (1977). This was the
last annual report which contained statistical information on issuers. This report also cited
6,798 securities listed on a registered stock exchange representing 3,283 separate issuers, and
cited 2,627 issuers which were regularly quoted in the NASDAQ System. Id. at 311, 315.
19. The approximately 6,500 publicly traded corporations are subject to the regulatory
provisions of the 1934 Exchange Act. All must file periodic reports, send information to shareholders at least once a year under the proxy provisions, and subject officers and directors to the
insider trading provisions.
Historically the SEC has given priority to regulation of the initial distribution of securities
under the 1933 Act. The primary purpose of the regulatory activity has been to protect investors from fraud, and is aimed at wrongdoing by issuers, licensed broker-dealers, accountants,
lawyers, and other participants in the market place. During the past several years there has
been a shift of emphasis to regulation of continuous disclosure and concern with the quality of
the marketplace. In terms both of shareholder protection and the public interest this shift is
proper and should be accelerated. Today, the highest priority of the SEC should be to promote the operation of the secondary trading markets.
The primary function for state regulation of the publicly traded corporation is to provide a
forum for enforcing strong and consistent fiduciary duties on officers and directors.
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corporations, to incorporate in the state where their principal place
of business is located.20 The need for greater state governance of
quasi-publicly traded corporations is increased by the lack of federal
controls. Companies in the quasi-public category are not registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and thus are not covered
by federal disclosure, proxy, takeover bid, and insider trading regulations. If one views these provisions as designed to protect the trading markets, it is sensible that they would not apply to quasi-publicly
traded corporations. Nevertheless, in many respects, it is the shareholders in these companies that have the greatest need for the direct
regulatory protection offered by the 1934 Act. State law must pick
up where the federal regulation stops.
State legislatures transformed their corporate regulations into enabling statutes to attract large corporations. And, indeed, aside from
identifying fiduciary duties it is appropriate that state law be
uninvolved in direct regulation of publicly traded corporations. But
it is time to return to a regulatory orientation for the quasi-publicly
traded corporation. States should begin with four reforms from
which publicly traded corporations could be exempted: shareholder
voting controls; preemptive stock purchasing rights; appraisal rights;
and mandatory disclosure of information to shareholders.
First, state corporation statutes should require procedures that
insure shareholder voting control. Shareholder voting rights are desirable not because they assure accountability (their primary virtue
in the context of large publicly traded companies), but because they
promote actual shareholder control. Shareholders in the quasi-publicly traded corporation cannot exercise their option under the "Wall
Street ·Rule,"21 so they must be able to influence or change management and its policies in some other way when they are dissatisfied
with the operation of their company. For companies with fewer than
500 shareholders, the shareholder meeting is usually the forum for
actual voting. The proxy system can be critical, and state law should
give a high priority to proxy regulation in order to insure fair and
proper voting procedures. There is little need to require prior review
of corporate proxy materials, but there should be rules punishing
20. See CAL. CoRP. CooE § 2115 (West 1979). Under the provisions of the California
Corporation Code, a state could invoke its jurisdiction over "foreign" corporations that have a
significant nexus within the state.
21. For the past generation, the conventional wisdom has been that investors in publicly
traded companies follow the "Wall Street Rule": if shareholders are dissatisfied with the company, their recourse is to sell their shares. Like much conventional wisdom, this is generally
accurate. It is inaccurate in part because of the failure to recognize the number of publicly
traded corporations in which stock is concentrated in large blocks, and because of employee
stockholders who may be locked into their investment.
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misleading statements or omissions, and investors should have easy
access to shareholder lists. The various structural prohibitions which
were a part of many state corporation acts should also be reconsidered. Our goal is to provide shareholders an opportunity to control
management through the directors, so only shares with voting rights
should be sold. Staggered terms for directors should be prevented,
and other devices that restrict shareholder control should be prohibited. Cumulative voting should be allowed, because it assures some
representation for minority shareholders who may be locked into
their investment.
Second, shareholders in quasi-publicly traded corporations
should have a preemptive right to purchase a pro rata share of the
securities in any new stock issuance. Mandatory preemptive rights
have disappeared from almost all state corporation acts because they
offer stockholders of publicly traded companies unnecessary protection. But for quasi-publicly traded corporations, a well-drafted preemptive rights statute makes sense. Preemptive rights preserve both
the investor's voting power and the value of his stock. Voting power
is preserved because a shareholder who owns a percentage of shares
would be able to retain the same percentage following any future
issuance of stock by the company. Where no public market for the
shares exists, a shareholder denied preemptive rights is unable to
maintain his relative position of control. Preemptive rights also prevent dilution of share value. The lack of a trading market to establish value makes the setting of a price on a new distribution of stock
a matter of guesswork, and even the good faith of the directors will
not prevent dilution if there is no way to determine market value.
Because preemptive rights permit the shareholder to retain ownership of the same percentage of outstanding shares before and after
each new issuance, they prevent dilution of the value of the investment. Thus, while preemptive rights are of little or no value to a
shareholder in a publicly traded corporation, they are essential to
shareholders in a company whose shares are not actively traded.
Third, shareholders in quasi-publicly traded corporations should
have limited appraisal rights. When the investor does not approve of
fundamental change in the nature of the corporation, he should be
able to obtain the cash value of his investment from the corporation.
The appraisal right should be limited because the investor who
purchases shares in a quasi-public corporation should know that his
investment is not liquid and should not expect to be able to resell his
shares to the corporation unless a specific contractual agreement provides for repurchase. Nevertheless, an investor in even a quasi-pub-
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lie corporation has the reasonable expectation that it will continue in
the same line of business and that it will operate under the same
general structure. If a majority of the shareholders in a quasi-public
corporation decides to make fundamental changes in the corporation
- amendments to the articles of incorporation, sale of substantially
all of the assets, or restructuring through merger or combination - a
dissenter should have appraisal rights to protect his reasonable expectation.
Shareholders in publicly traded corporations have little reason to
object to the recent changes in many corporation statutes which permit fundamental changes and amendments with a simple majority
vote. The dissenting shareholder in a publicly traded company has
little need for appraisal rights since he can sell his shares on the market. 22 Similarly, dissatisfied shareholders in an incorporated partnership often have a contractual right to force a dissolution. But a
dissenting shareholder in a quasi-publicly traded corporation has access to no trading market, and dissolution is not a fair or appropriate
solution. In this situation statutory provisions providing for appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders are a reasonable answer.
Appraisal rights provide the dissenting shareholders an option to
maintain their investment in the new or altered enterprise or to receive the cash value of their investment. The use of the appraisal
mechanism by the majority to squeeze out minority holders raises
different questions involving the fiduciary responsibilities of the majority to the minority. The appraisal remedy should be viewed as a
compromise that allows a substantial majority of existing shareholders to change the basic nature of the company if they want to, while
at the same time assuring liquidity to the dissenters. The appraisal
remedy should be rigorous enough to keep management from doing
indirectly what it would be prohibited from doing directly. And because the appraisal remedy is analogous to a statutory buy-out
agreement, it is appropriate to provide a period of time for payment
in order not to force actual liquidation or dissolution of the company.
.
Finally, shareholders in quasi-publicly traded corporations
should have a right to information about their investment. Corporations with fewer than 500 shareholders are not bound by federal reporting requirements, and in most states no laws adequately regulate
financial disclosure to shareholders. Some economists have argued
22. For competing arguments about appraisal rights even in publicly traded companies,
see M. EISENBERG, supra note I 0, at 69-84, and Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy:
An Essay far Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
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that because there is a market for information about publicly traded
companies, the regulatory provisions of the federal securities laws
play a rather modest role in disclosure of information by those companies. The marketplace itself forces disclosure when such companies attempt to sell securities to the public and when shares are
actively traded in the secondary market. Without a marketplace
there is no economic pressure for disclosure. After the time of initial
investment, investors in a quasi-publicly traded company have little
bargaining power to force the company to make periodic financial
disclosures. For the publicly traded corporation, disclosure is
needed if the marketplace is to evaluate the shares accurately. ;For
the quasi-publicly traded company, disclosure is needed if the shareholders are to judge the progress of the company, evaluate management, and exercise their voting rights.
At a minimum, state regulations should entitle shareholders of
quasi-publicly traded corporations to an annual report including
financial statements, and should protect shareholders from false or
misleading statements in a company's periodic reports, proxy literature, or other communications. This protection need not entail great
expense; a rule similar to rule 242 of the 1933 Securities Act might be
adopted. This rule would merely require that a corporation provide
equivalent information to all investors - thereby assuring that all
investors will share information that any one investor receives.
Together, these four reforms go a long way toward providing investors in quasi-publicly traded corporations the protection they
need. State general corporation acts should be amended to apply
these provisions, not to all corporations, but only to those corporations where the need is identified.
II.

THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

Although it has attracted far more attention than has the quasipublicly traded corporation, the search for the appropriate role for
the corporate director remains the central problem of corporate governance. Traditional analysis focuses on the director's obligations of
due care and loyalty, but understates the key feature of these obligations - that they are owed to the corporation. In this section I emphasize that the director should be viewed as a fiduciary to the
corporate entity. The fiduciary concept clearly identifies the director's obligations to the corporation and permits flexibility in the director's role according to the nature of the enterprise.
The fiduciary duties of directors arise because property has been
placed in their care. Directors have a responsibility to use that prop-
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erty according to the terms of the corporate charter, the law, and the
general requirements of good citizenship imposed on any owner of
the property. Fiduciaries owe duties to a principal. Directors of
large publicly traded corporations, small corporations, and nonprofit
corporations all owe fiduciary duties to their corporation, and not to
any particular corporate constituency.23 Their specific responsibilities in complying with these duties will differ depending on the purpose and power of the corporations they serve. Directors of ~11
-corporations have a responsibility to use funds properly, not to waste
corporate assets, to insure honest and efficient management, and to
carry out the purposes of the corporate charter. The director or
trustee of a private university makes decisions based on what is best
for the university - the entity - and not for individual students or
faculty. In the same way, a director of a business corporation makes
decisions based on what is best for the entity, and not for the employees or even the individual shareholders. By comparing the responsibilities of the directors of publicly traded business
corporations and nonprofit corporations, I do not mean to underestimate the importance of the profit-making purpose of business corporations, but rather to stress that the entity and the corporate purpose
is the focus of a director's duties. Professor Dodd advocated a similar concept when he urged that directors should think of themselves
not as attorneys for the investors, but as trustees for the enterprise. 24
Some commentators have recently criticized the use of the term
"fiduciary" in defining directors' duties. The American Bar Association Committee on Corporations deliberately avoided the term in its
redraft of section 35 on the Duty of Care in the Model Business Corporation Act. 25 This avoidance is a mistake. While Justice Frank23. A breach of fiduciary duty can be challenged only by a director's or shareholder's suit
on behalf of the corporate entity. This emphasis is particularly important in the context of
corporate governance and the claims made by various corporate constituencies.
24. See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1160
(1932). There should be no presumption that consideration of the public interest will lead to a
splintering of director responsibility. There is also no case law that indicates potential liability
of directors for this approach. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 1970 N.W. 668
(1919), the court did admonish Henry Ford not to run the company for his own interests to the
detriment of shareholders, but it supported the expenditures for long-range corporate development. Bui see Conard, Reflections on Public Interest .Directors, 15 MICH. L. REV. 941, 947
(1977).
25. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 35 (Comments on Amendments), reprinted in 33 Bus.
LAW. 1631, 1634 (1978):

The committee took the view that those responsibilities of directors which are fiduciary in
nature would be sufficiently comprehended in the affirmative standard proposed so as to
make unnecessary the use of a term which represents the possibility of importing into the
area of corporation law more than is appropriate of the attributes and obligations of a
fiduciary as firmly established in the law of trusts.
On the other hand, Professor Coffee criticizes the use of the term because it is too narrow and
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furter was correct in stating that the designation of a party as a
"fiduciary" merely initiates the inquiry as to the specific obligations,26 this does not mean that the designation is without value. The
duties of directors of corporations have evolved through the com- ·
mon law, and have been built on the foundation of agency. In the
early 1800s judges and lawyers were well aware that directors were
fiduciaries. 27 The Restatement Second ofAgency states that an agent
is a fiduciary 28 and that members of boards of directors resemble
agents in that they act on behalf of others and are fiduciaries owing
duties of loyalty and care.29 Although the contemporary corporate
directorship involves complex relationships, 30 the decision-making
process su:ffers if corporate lawyers attempt to invest the term "director" with a new set of duties unrelated to fiduciary concepts. This
denies a rich and valuable heritage.
The .fiduciary concept is of particular value today to counteract
the influence of federal securities regulation on corporate law. For
the past twenty years plaintiffs' attorneys have attempted to squeeze
all varieties of director misconduct into the mold of breach of a duty
to disclose and, therefore, breach of the federal securities laws. This
emphasis has diminished directors' sensitivity to other aspects of
their duties. The prohibitions of conflicts of interest and breach of
due care and the requirements of fairness have taken second place.
The recent unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to
sanction a federal corporation law under the securities acts31 has restored prominence to state remedies and created a need to rediscover
traditional duties.
Under ~ost state corporations statutes, directors have the.responsibility to manage or direct the management of the corporation. To
carry out this responsibility directors must discharge duties of care
and of loyalty. When a corporation undertakes specific obligations,
directors as fiduciaries to the corporation are required to use due
care to insure that these obligations are performed. The director's
leads to "tunnel vision." See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
26. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85 (1943).
27. See E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 70-71 (1954).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).
29. "Members of boards resemble agents in that they act on behalf of others and are
fiduciaries owing duties of loyalty and care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14c,
comment (1958).
30. For a thoughtful description of relationships, see Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the
Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976).
31. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975).
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duty ofloyalty requires him to avoid conflicts of interest or to resolve
them in the best interest of his corporation. Each of these traditional
directors' duties - of care and of loyalty - is clarified by viewing
the director as a fiduciary. This section describes these duties, and
then turns to several remaining implications of applying the fiduciary concept to the corporate director.
A.

The .Director's .Duty of Care

A contemporary approach to the director's duty of care can best
be gleaned by reading the Model Business Corporation Act together
with the business judgment rule, the Corporate .Director's Guidebook,32 and several court decisions. Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act sets forth the basic corporate rule:
A director shall perform his duties as a director including his duties as
a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in
good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinary person in a
like position would use under similar circumstances.

This section is a slightly wordier form of the standard of care in most
jurisdictions in the United States, and closely resembles a typical
fiduciary standard of care.33 Even Delaware courts are reported to
follow this standard, though the legislature has not adopted the
MBCA language. 34
A short version of the business judgment rule is simply that a
corporate transaction not involving a conflict of interest will not be
subject to judicial inquiry if made in good faith. 35 Courts distinguish
between inquiry into the procedure by which the directors reached
32. Corporate .Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1978).
33. Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to a principal to act with
standard care and skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work for which he
is employed to perform, and in addition, to exercise any special skill that he has.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 379 (1958). Compare the standard of care for an agent
with that of a trustee in I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 174 (1959):
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing that
he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise
such skill.
The words are slightly rotated, but the thought remains the same in the standard of care described under ERISA:
. . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims.
34. For an excellent discussion of§ 35 of the MBCA in respect to Delaware law, see Arsht
& Hinsey, Cod!fted Standard- Same Harbor but Charted Channel· A Response, 35 Bus. LAW,
947 (1980).
35. For a longer version, see 35 Bus. LAW. at 956.
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their decision, and an inquiry into the correctness of the decision. 36
The good faith requirement places a burden on directors to show
how they reached the decision and what factors they considered. To
demonstrate good faith the directors need show only that the decision was made on a reasonable basis under the circumstances.
The Corporate .Director's Guidebook describes the duties and responsibilities of a director of a publicly traded corporation. The
Guidebook also presents a recommended organizational model for
the publicly traded company: a board with a majority of unaffiliated
directors and a committee structure with nominating, compensation,
and audit committees composed of unaffiliated directors. The Guidebook's recommended standards could quickly grow into legal requirements.37 For example, a director of a publicly traded company
might not be acting in good faith if a majority of his board members
are "insiders." Similarly, if the board is organized without a series
of committees, has no staffing assistance, and has no access to needed
information, the director may not be acting in good faith.
Section 35 of the MBCA als~ontains a provision allowing a director to rely upon documents and statements made by others
"whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent." A recent supplement to the Corporate .Director's Guidebook
describes the role and function of the Audit Committee, and suggests
an agenda, timetable, and procedures for an audit committee of a
publicly traded company.38 If one adds the suggestions in this guide
to section 35, one acceptable pattern of an internal control system
emerges. If followed, it should allow directors to rely on documents
and statements prepared by the company officers. It is a description
of due care which would permit the presumption that a director acts
reasonably when he believes that an officer or employee is reliable
and competent.
The courts have infrequently considered the director's proper
duty of care to the corporate entity, but an analogy can be drawn
from two securities cases. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corporation39 contains the most complete discussion of director liability
36. A specific articulation of this approach to due care and the business judgment rule was
made by the New York Court of Appeals in upholding a decision by directors to dismiss a
shareholder's derivative suit Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.
920 (N.Y. 1979).
37. The Corporate Pirector's Guidebook applies only to publicly traded corporations. It is
to be expected that different responsibilities and organizational patterns would apply to directors of other corporate entities.
38. ABA COMMITIEE ON CORP. LAWS, THE OVERVIEW COMMITIEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, reprinted in 35 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1351 (1980).
39. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

492

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:478

under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The court held various directors liable to purchasers of securities during a public offering because, of material misstatements in the prospectus. The
directors failed to prove the affirmative defense available to a director who shows that "he had after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true." 40 In a related case, Lanza v. .Drexel & Co. ,41 the plaintiffs
alleged director responsibility for misstatements of corporate officers
during a private merger transaction in violation of rule IOb-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a common-law standard of care.
The court found no liability. An analysis of these two cases in terms
of strict liability, scienter, recklessness or negligence is not helpful.
The focus should be on whether the director used such care as an
ordinary prudent person would use in a public securities offering
(Barchris) or in a private offering (Lanza). It is necessary in these
circumstances to think not only of individual due care but also of the
directors' collective duty. Did the directors organize the board structure to appropriately monitor a securities offering? Did they direct
management on appropriate standards for release of information in
connection with a stock offering? Did they develop appropriate internal auditing standards, and a check by an audit committee of the
needed disclosure documents? Were these internal standards sufficient to allow the directors to rely on documents prepared by management?
The degree of care expected from a director of a publicly traded
corporation has increased dramatically in the past decade. It would
not be surprising for this growth to continue through the 1980s.
What is considered prudent behavior for a director of a corporation
should depend upon a thoughtful consideration of practical business
considerations, as well as of questions of liability. The American
Law Institute project on corporate governance should examine this
approach through a Restatement of Fiduciary Duties of Directors.42

B. The .Director's .Duty of Loyalty
No single statutory provision covers the subject of loyalty as
comprehensively as section 35 of the MBCA covers due care. While
almost all state corporation laws have provisions similar to section
40. Securities Act of 1933 § ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976).
41. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. The American Law Institute has announced a project on Corporate Goverance under
the direction of Stanley Kaplan.
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41 of the MBCA, which specifies procedures when a corporation enters into a contract in which a director has a private interest, these
procedures address only one of a large number of loyalty duties.
Section 41 of the MBCA has limited application even with respect to
contracts between a director and a corporation. It prevents contracts
from being void or voidable because a director is on one side of the
agreement, if after disclosure there has been approval by a majority
of the board of disinterested directors, or a vote of the shareholders,
or if the contract is fair. Section 41 is silent on the potential for challenging a contract because of other conflicts of interest, or because of
unfairness. In most state corporation acts, no statutory provisions
cover corporate opportunity, use of confidential information, relationships between parent and subsidiary corporations, and the multitude of other conflict-of-interest situations which arise in a corporate
setting. Traditional agency analysis is a helpful place to begin examining corporate conflict of interest. A brief description of the issues
involved in four settings - corporate opportunity, insider trading,
multiple directorships, and parent-subsidiary problems - demonstrates the value of identifying directors as fiduciaries to the corporate enterprise.
A classic corporate opportunity conflict-of-interest case arises
when an officer-director hears about an investment opportunity because of his position, uses company resources to develop a product in
the line of business of the corporation, does not give the company a
chance to reject the opportunity, and then takes the product for his
own private use. 43 One way to analyze this problem is to compare it
to the the way courts treat the conflict-of-interest dilemma in an individual agency situation. When there is a conflict between the
agent's personal interest and the interest of the principal, the agent's
duty is clear. The real estate agent who purchases land for himself
when traveling on an employer's expense account must hold the land
in constructive trust for his employer.44 In addition to any remedy
for breach of contract or damages in tort, the agent can be forced to
disgorge any profits he made from the use of information or resources gained from his position even if the principal cannot prove
any actual damages. Onlyfull disclosure to the principal followed by
his consent will allow an agent to profit from information or resources received from his agency position.
In the corporate setting, one difficulty is determining whether the
43. See Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
44. See, e.g., Whitten v. Wright, 206 Minn. 423, 289 N.W. 509 (1939).
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agent has permission to use the opportunity. How is full disclosure
made to the enterprise, and how does the enterprise give consent? It
is usually assumed that since directors are responsible for the management of the corporation (or directing the management), disclosure to directors and receipt of their consent is sufficient to avoid
liability. By analogy, provisions such as section 41 of the MBCA
permit directors to obtain consent to their personal involvement in a
contract with the corporation by disclosure and the vote of disinterested directors. In some situations, however, this is not an appropriate procedure because directors are incapable of giving consent.
This problem can arise when a majority of the directors are involved
in the transaction, or when the nature of the information or resources used has a direct effect on individual shareholders. An example of this latter situation is the use of inside information by
officers and directors to trade in shares of the company.
Most insider trading cases have been based on allegations of
fraud between individual purchasers and sellers, and have been
brought under rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.45
An alternative approach that seems particularly appropriate to insider trading of the shares of publicly traded companies is to base the
liability on the fiduciary duty of directors and employees not to use
information gained on the job for personal profit. Unless there has
been full disclosure to and consent by the corporation, any director
or agent has a duty to disgorge any profits made from use of insider
information. The duty does not rest on any showing of damage or
loss. This approach was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals
in .Diamond v. Oreamuno, 46 but it has been rejected in Florida. The
Florida Supreme Court has taken the position that directors do not
owe any duties to individual shareholders, and that the insider trading must damage the corporation before the corporation can recover.47 The Florida court missed the basic fiduciary remedy which
would require disgorgement of profits regardless of any showing of
damage.
Multiple directorships present a particularly difficult dilemma for
the agency approach to corporate conflicts of interest.48 The normal
45. Compare Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) with SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971),
46. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910,401 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
47. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975). This case involved a corporate officer as
tippee, and direct profits were not shown. The court disavowed Diamond v. Oreamuno, however, stating that a derivative suit could not be brought unless there was a showing of damage
to the corporation.
48. See, e.g., Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 191 A.2d 919 (1956).
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expectation in an agency relationship is that the agent will not serve
competing clients. The exceptions - for example, the real estate
broker who represents several s_ellers of property - are based on an
assumption that the agent has made full disclosure of his conflict,
and that the sellers have consented to their agent operating for competing parties.49 If he acted without disclosure and consent, the real
estate agent would violate his fiduciary duties. The parties also assume that the agent will treat each seller fairly, without any breach
of confidential information. By analogy, the starting point for analyzing multiple directorships should be a prohibition against serving
on boards of competing companies. The key to exceptions should be
the expectation of shareholders of the competing corporate entities,
the extent of the disclosure needed, and the nature of the consent.
The relationship of a parent corporation to minority shareholders
of a subsidiary presents a fourth set of particularly difficult conflictof-interest problems. The conflicts may be so fundamental that disclosure cannot cure them, and even if disclosure is capable of providing a remedy there remains the question of insuring effective
shareholder consent. State corporation statutes similar to section 41
of the MBCA are not helpful. In the contract between a parent corporation and its subsidiary, the whole board of each corporation is
an interested party. In effect the parent is negotiating on both sides
of the agreement. In this situation it is also unrealistic to think in
terms of any meaningful consent by shareholders of the subsidiary,
because the parent corporation usually controls the overwhelming
majority of the shares.
In Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, so the Delaware Supreme
Court recognized the fiduciary duty of a parent corporation to a subsidiary, but held that the duties applied only to transactions involving self-dealing, which it defined as transactions in which the parent
receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion and detriment of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. If a transaction
involves self-dealing, the court held, the test of intrinsic fairness
shifts the burden of proof to the parent. In all other situations the
usual business judgment rule was held to apply. The court failed to
recognize that parent and subsidiary transactions always involve
49. See Foley v. Mathias, 211 Iowa 160, 233 N.W. 106 (1930).
50. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). Sinclair Oil involved a dispute between the minority shareholders of a subsidiary (Sinven), and the parent company (Sinclair). The complaint alleged
the misdirection of corporate opportunity, payment of excessive dividends, and unfairness in
contract negotiation. Sinclair owned 97% of the stock of Sinven, and nominated and elected
all members of the board of Sinven, all of whom were officers and directors of Sinclair.
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conflicts of interest, and are incapable of resolution by disclosure
and consent of disinterested members of the board. A traditional
agency approach would shift the burden of proof to the parent's directors in all transactions between a parent corporation and a subsidiary with minority shareholders. This rule is an appropriate starting
place, but without more it could encourage corporations to squeeze
out the minority shareholders of their subsidiaries. This would be
unfortunate, because squeeze-outs can frequently work a hardship
on shareholders. To protect shareholders from such hardships courts
should consider the expectations of shareholders investing in subsidiaries, and the existence or lack of a trading market. Where a subsidiary must have minority shareholders (as is the case for many
foreign subsidiaries) there should be guidelines for arms-length
transactions and a standard for judging fairness.
The relationship of "due care," the "business judgment rule,"
and conflict of interest becomes extremely complex. The American
Law Institute project on corporate governance can also perform a
valuable service in this area. In particular, it can develop procedures
for providing disclosure and obtaining consent that vary according
to whether the corporation is publicly traded, privately held, or nonprofit. I believe the best starting place for resolving these issues is
the specific application of traditional fiduciary duties.
C. The .Director as a Fiduciary
The emphasis on the fiduciary responsibility of directors to the
entity also helps us address two other problems of corporate governance. First, the fiduciary concept helps to define the factors directors should consider in making decisions for the corporation.
Second, the concept suggests a proper composition for the board.
The first problem - what factors a director should consider in
decision-making - frequently arises when someone complains
about the social irresponsibility of a corporation's decision (whether
it be to lay off workers, to manufacture a controversial product, or its
failure to make substantial charitable contributions). Corporate social responsibility is usually discussed in terms of a conflict in directors' duties. Are directors under a duty only to maximize profits for
shareholders, or is it appropriate to consider the interests of employees, consumers, neighbors of corporate facilities, and members of the
general public? The Business Roundtable identifies oversight of corporate social responsibility as one of the four main duties of direc-
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tors. 51 At the same time, it charges directors to "direct the enterprise
in the interest of the owners, subject to constraints imposed by law."
This apparent conflict is resolved by stressing the goal of long-term
profitability rather than short-term profit maximization. The
Roundtable opens the door to consideration of social responsibility
by stating that long-term profitability is tied to the social viability of
the corporation. By appealing to long-term profitability and the
needs of future investors, directors are in less danger of criticism.
Yet this solution is ultimately unsatisfying.
The question of what a director is entitled to consider in making
a judgment affecting the corporation is brought sharply into focus in
the takeover bid situation. When a bid at a substantial premium
over current market price is made, directors must decide whether to
endorse or fight the offer. 52 It is natural for personal considerations
to play a role in these decisions, and it can be argued that allowing
directors to consider any interest other than immediate shareholder
pro.fit only provides a cover for decisions based on personal interests.
Conflict-of-interest questions aside, however, is it in the public interest to allow directors to consider the impact of a takeover on employees, local communities, and the long-range development of the
company? Do boards have to do what is best for the arbitragers and
professional investors who hope to turn a quick pro.fit? Do boards
need to evaluate their corporations constantly to see if liquidation
most benefits shareholders? Arguing long-term versus short-term
pro.fits is one way for directors to rationalize rejection of an immediate premium for existing shareholders. It provides an acceptable basis for boards to maintain the independence of the corporation. No
one can object to a company's purchase of mineral reserves to be
used twenty years later, development of a personnel plan to produce
future executives, or investment in research and development which
may have only a long-term returi:L. Long-term profitability is a concept that makes sense, and allows directors import~t latitµde .in exercising their duty of care. But one should not be foole~ by it. ,The
concept legitimates consideration of the needs of future investors,
and this implies that the corporate entity has a life of its own. A
51. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5.
52. A distinction should be made between a partial tender offer and a 100% takeover. In
the partial takeover control will shift, but minority shareholders of the target remain. In this
situation it is necessary for directors of the target company to investigate the honesty and
competency of the bidding company. Long-range business plans are also important. It can be
argued that in the 100% takeover situation the target management need look only to the question of adequacy of price.
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more straightforward and accurate description of a director's duty is
to identify the object of the duty as the enterprise itself.
Identifying the director's duty to the entity allows consideration
of all factors which have a bearing on long-term benefit. Dissolution
and liquidation may be appropriate if a corporation can no longer
achieve its purpose, but directors do not constantly need to evaluate
and base decisions on short-term return for investors. Duty to the
entity also helps identify directors' general duties of social responsibility and corporate accountability. Our expectation that individuals
will act in a socially responsible manner is not removed by the process of incorporation. The directors' obligation to act for the benefit
of the entity and the shareholders collectively includes the obligation
to insure the entity does what society expects. If a corporate entity
has responsibilities in the community in which it operates because of
its size and power, then it is not only appropriate, but necessary that
directors consider these responsibilities in their decision-making. As
part of a director's duty of care he needs to insure that the entity is
able to meet its obligation of good citizenship. For example, it may
be that all large economic entities should have not only an audit
~committee (and, if a publicly traded corporation, a nominating committee) but also a public policy committee charged with identifying
the specific social responsibilities of the corporation and monitoring
their fulfillment.
This fiduciary approach places an obligation to monitor corporate behavior on the directors. Directors as fiduciaries to the corporation must exercise appropriate due care under the circumstances to
provide compliance with the law, and failure can lead to liability.
These fiduciary obligations can be enforced not only by shareholders, but by the public through both criminal and civil actions. Directors, of course, are not insurers of corporate behavior. They should
not be held vicariously liable for negligent or criminal acts of corporate agents, but they do have a duty of care that extends to all aspects
of corporate, activity. Because directors are the representatives and
stewards53 of the owners, the public has a right to look to the directors when a corporation fails to meet its obligations.
The fiduciary underpinnings of corporate conflict of interest
53. The Business Roundtable statement includes the following: "The directors are stewards - stewards of the owner's interest in the enterprise, and stewards also of the owner's legal
and ethical obligations to other groups affected by corporate activity." See 33 Bus. LAW. 2083,
2096 (1978). An English commentator expressed a similar concept: "Now our corporation
laws put great emphasis on the fiduciary duties of directors . . . . (A director] owes only one
duty, honesty to the interests of his company." Brown.An English Perspective, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 148.
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cases also help to resolve the corporate governance problems involving the composition and structure of the board of directors. First,
the fiduciary concept encourages the use of outside directors. The
desire for nonmanagement directors on the board and for a separate
nominating committee composed of outside directors is at least in
part a response to conflict of interest concerns. In any conflict-ofinterest case involving officers, the directors making the decision
should be as independent as possible. The role of the board of directors in takeover bid situations54 and in determining whether or not to
recommend dismissal of a derivative suit55 ~re contemporary examples where the role of outside directors is generally recognized as
crucial. The existence of a nominating committee composed only of
outside directors may become an important test of independent judgment in actions by directors of publicly traded corporations.
In this context the desirability of outside directors is deterin.ined
by the size and complexities of the corporation. The greater the economic impact of the corporate entity, the greater the need for outside
directors. This need is both to reduce the conflict of interest that
exists when all directors are employees and members of management, and to provide a diversity of experience and background.
Publicly traded corporations should have a substantial number of
outside directors because of the large number of shareholders.
Quasi-publicly traded corporations which have a significant number
of employees, or affect the community in other significant ways
should also have outside representation, as should the boards of major nonprofit corporations. Composition of boards of directors
should mirror the complexity and diversity of the corporation's activities; no one pattern is appropriate.
Finally, the emphasis on the corporate entity argues against the
use of constituency directors. Directors elected or appointed to represent particular constituencies have a splintered allegiance, and can
create inherent conflicts of interest.56 This is as true of; employee
representatives on boards as it is of student or alumni representatives
on nonprofit education boards. The goal should not be to "balance
54. For a case with strong reliance on good faith and the business judgment rule, see
Painter v. Marshall Field & Co., 386 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. ill. 1980).
55. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), where the court said even an
independent board cannot foreclose a derivative suit.
56. Conflict of interest could also be alleged where a director promoted the interests of
only a single group of shareholders. It is also theoretically possible that a director's allegiance
to all stockholders could conflict with his duty to the corporate entity, but such a conflict seems
unlikely.
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conflict of interest," but to select individuals who recognize their allegiance to the enterprise itself.
CONCLUSION

Many of the key problems subsumed under the rubric of corporate governance were identified nearly fifty years ago. This Essay
has attempted to identify the contemporary corporate governance issues of the quasi-publicly traded corporation and the role of the corporate director, and to focus the analysis of these issues on the role
of the securities markets and evolving fiduciary standards for directors. Yet the target is still moving, and much work remains to be
done.

